Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey

The concept of “cultural diplomacy,” refers to the exchange of ideas, information, art, and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding. But “cultural diplomacy” can also be more of a one-way street than a two-way exchange, as when one nation concentrates its efforts on promoting the national language, explaining its policies and point of view, or “telling its story” to the rest of the world.

The essay that follows has two objectives. First, to provide a brief survey of some of the major cultural policy initiatives of the United States government from the 1930’s until recent times. Second, to underscore some of the broader patterns and trends that can be discerned in America’s cultural relations with other countries and other peoples.

One of the first major American initiatives in cultural diplomacy came in response to Nazi Germany’s “cultural offensive” in Latin America during the 1930s. The German activities in the Americas were described by a U.S. cultural affairs officer as “well-organized and well subsidized, and designed to counteract and weaken U.S. cultural relationships with the Latin American countries and discredit U.S. motives and purposes in the area.” In response, at the Pan American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace in Buenos Aires in 1936, the United States delegation proposed a Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations, which was approved unanimously. The preamble to the convention stated the goals as follows:

Considering that the purpose for which the Conference was called would be advanced by greater mutual knowledge and understanding of the people and institutions of the countries represented…; and that such results would be appreciably promoted by an exchange of professors, teachers, and students among the American countries, as well as by encouragement of a closer relationship between unofficial organizations which exert an influence on
the formation of public opinion …the Governments represented here have resolved to conclude a convention for that purpose.…

As Kevin Mulcahy has pointed out, several major features of later United States efforts in cultural diplomacy were foreshadowed in this 1936 Buenos Aires Convention. 1 Exchanges of people were to be used to strengthen cultural relations and intellectual cooperation among the United States and other nations. The exchange should be truly reciprocal and should involve nongovernmental, unofficial groups and organizations, such as labor unions, college faculty members, youth groups, and social service organizations. At the same time, the goal of the United States Department of State was clear: it hoped that the exchange would promote better relations with other nations and the improvement of America’s image abroad.

Two years later, in May 1938, the U.S. Department of State sponsored a meeting on inter-American cultural cooperation to announce that it intended to establish a Division of Cultural Relations. In their opening remarks, State Department representatives described the purposes of the new division:

[T]o provide Government leadership in initiating and conducting an organized, coordinated, long-term national effort to strengthen U.S. cultural relations with other countries, beginning with the countries of Latin America where a cultural treaty obligation was pending.

The Department wanted to assure the group that it expected to rely on the private sector as the major partner in sponsored programs, and to be able to publicly announce from the outset that the decision to establish a Division of Cultural Relations in the Department was based on discussion with an approval by the major national philanthropic, educational, and cultural entities of the country.…. In addition, “The Department impressed on the group that because of the increasing tempo of Nazi inroads in Latin America, ‘time is of the essence.’”

One year later, World War II began in Europe, and there soon followed a number of major landmarks in the development of America’s cultural diplomacy. Working within the State Department, Nelson Rockefeller developed a comprehensive program to promote closer cultural

relations with Latin America, especially Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico. Rockefeller’s efforts led to exhibits at the Museum of Modern Art in New York of the work of leading artists from those countries, and the State Department programs also sent art exhibitions and performing arts groups, such as American Ballet Theater, to Latin America.

These new program initiatives within the State Department did not come about without some spirited bureaucratic infighting. As Rockefeller developed his programs, his independence of spirit and direct personal ties to President Roosevelt greatly irritated Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles. It would not be the last time that governmental turf wars were a feature of America’s cultural diplomacy.

Then came the United States’ entry into World War II and even greater American involvement in various aspects of cultural relations. There were expanded activities by the Division of Cultural Relations, new program developments by the Office of the Coordinator for Inter-American Affairs (Nelson Rockefeller, again), and the creation of the Office of War Information. The Office of War Information represented the harder-edged side of America’s cultural and information programs. Unlike the exchange programs, which emphasized a two-way exchange of ideas and views, the primary job of the Office of War Information was to explain America’s purposes and objectives to the world.

During World War II, Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone and Justice Owen J. Roberts of the United States Supreme Court played a major role in one of the most benign and effective initiatives concerning the arts ever conducted by the American government. In 1942, Chief Justice Stone was approached by several leading figures in the American arts world – Francis Henry Taylor, director of the Metropolitan Museum of Art; Sumner McKnight Crosby, president of the College Art Association; William B. Dinsmoor, president of the Archeological Institute of America; and David E. Finley, director of the National Gallery of Art. The four men explained to Stone that the Nazi government of Germany had systematically pillaged major art collections from other European countries that were occupied by Germany during the war. A number of these stolen art objects were now in the personal art collections of Nazi government officials; many others were held in German museums or in hideaways in the German countryside. Chief Justice Stone immediately took a personal interest in the problem and, in turn, asked President Roosevelt for his support.
Within government circles in Washington, Stone began to argue strongly that American military forces should be organized and prepared to protect these collections when American troops entered Germany. He also argued that there should be orderly procedures for returning the art collections to the previous owners. After extensive discussions among several government agencies, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in August 1943 the Department of State announced the establishment of an American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas.

The chairman of the commission was Justice Owen J. Roberts, and it was this commission that worked with the War Department to plan for what was to come when Germany was occupied. In one of the most successful operations of the war, the majority of the stolen art collections were saved and returned in 1945 and 1946 to the museums from which they had come.

In addition, before these stolen art collections were returned to Austria, or to other countries from which they had been taken, some of the collections toured the United States. Huge crowds turned out to view them in a number of American cities. In a real sense, these tours of stolen art treasures were among the first “blockbuster” art exhibitions in the United States, and their impact on stimulating domestic American interest in the arts may have been substantial.

Then, as World War II ended and was followed by the Cold War, came a new set of government educational and cultural efforts. In the U.S. zone of occupation in the former Nazi Germany, a massive educational and cultural program was undertaken to try to re-educate and reorient the German people in the values of a democratic system. Educational and cultural exchanges were an important part of this broader educational campaign. Between 1945 and 1954, more than 12,000 Germans and 2,000 Americans participated in the U.S. government’s exchange programs between the two nations. A similar program was carried out in occupied Japan, after the war in the Pacific ended in August 1945.

In 1945, President Truman transferred to the Department of State the international information functions of the two wartime agencies, the Office of War Information and the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. Their functions were combined with those of the Division of Cultural Relations to form the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs, renamed a year later as the Office of International Information and Educational
Exchange. The office was to report to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. In the years that followed, there would be many more changes – and reorganizations – of the government agencies entrusted with the conduct of America’s programs in cultural diplomacy.

The following year saw the start of what is probably the most famous program of educational and cultural exchange in American history. Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, who as a Rhodes Scholar had studied in England with the aid of a non-governmental scholarship plan, sponsored and helped to pass Public Law 79-584 – the Fulbright Act. Under the law, the Department of State was authorized to enter into executive agreements with foreign governments and to use foreign currencies acquired through the sale of U.S. war surplus to finance academic and cultural exchanges. In later years, the federal government made annual appropriations to maintain and continue what came to be called the Fulbright Program.

When the program reached its fiftieth birthday in 1996, it was evaluated by a privately-financed study by a committee of scholars and business people assembled by the National Humanities Center. The committee noted that, between 1946 and 1996, some 250,000 men and women had benefited from Fulbright Scholarships. The committee also articulated the underlying rationale for cultural exchange programs that supporters of those programs have always advanced:

Whatever the field of study or profession of its recipients, the Fulbright experience has enlarged and deepened the perspective of potential national and international leaders. It has produced a cadre of pacesetters in the United States knowledgeable about, and sympathetic to, the aspirations of the world. And in nation after nation, as Fulbright alumni have assumed the responsibilities of leadership, they have brought with them an appreciation of the values Americans hold dear.

In 1946, the United States government also made another brief foray into cultural diplomacy that turned out to be much less successful than the Fulbright Act. Within the State Department there was a group of public officials who wanted to highlight America’s achievements in arts and culture. As Assistant Secretary of State William Benton put it, they hoped to demonstrate “to all those abroad who thought of the United States as a nation of materialists, that the same country which produces brilliant scientists and engineers also produces creative artists.”
With this in mind, the State Department put together two art exhibition programs. The first exhibition “American Industry Sponsors Art” was designed to show the best of both American worlds – the world of culture as contained in the art collections of the business world. For the exhibition the State Department’s art expert J. Leroy Davidson (a former assistant director of the Walker Art Center in Minneapolis) selected works from the collection of Thomas J. Watson, the president of IBM. Later, works of art were added from other corporate collections, including Standard Oil of New Jersey, Pepsi Cola, and the Container Corporation of America.

This first 1946 State Department art exhibit, which traveled to Egypt and Europe, aroused little controversy. But a second art exhibition organized by the State Department later that year was not so fortunate. Several foreign governments had requested examples of modern American art. Working with about $50,000 in State Department funds, Davidson purchased a set of paintings that were representative of then recent trends in American art. Some of the works were by the same artists as those in the corporate collections, painters like John Marin, Max Weber, Stuart Davis, Ben Shahn, Byron Browne, and Phillip Evergood. But the bulk of the purchased collection came from other American painters, including William Grooper, Philip Guston, Robert Gwathmey, Marsden Hartley, Yasuo Kuniyoshi, Jack Levine, Georgia O’Keeffe, Anton Refregier, and Charles Sheeler.²

By its very nature, “the collection, entitled “Advancing American Art,” lacked the balance of the IBM exhibit.”³ It was, as Newsweek put it, “frankly weighted on the experimental and creative side.” The New York Times critic Edward A. Jewell drew attention to the number of “canvases belonging in the categories of extreme expressionism, fantasy, surrealism and abstraction…” And, Jewell asserted, Mr. Davidson had “made no attempt to present a rounded report on contemporary painting in America.”⁴

In any event, “Advancing American Art,” was widely perceived as emphasizing “modern art,” and caused one of the biggest controversies in the U.S. art world in many years. As Gary Larson has pointed out, “[T]he State Department art program was vulnerable to attack from a variety of quarters – from Republican congressmen in search of an easy Democratic target,

---
³ Ibid.
⁴ Ibid.
from conservative newspapers ever on the lookout for federal extravagance, from academic painters opposed to modern art, and even from disgruntled artists who were upset, quite simply, that they had been overlooked by the State Department’s program.”

Perhaps the most pungent comment on the exhibition from an American political leader, however, came from President Truman himself. In a reference to one of the paintings in the collection, the president declared: “If that is art, I’m a Hottentot.”

In the face of the public outcry, the Department of State soon decided to liquidate its art holdings. The entire collection was declared “surplus property” by the State Department, and it was put up for sale and sold by the War Assets Administration.

In 1946 and 1947, there was also a major sea change in American attitudes toward the rest of the world. The initial optimism and hopes for “one world” of 1945 had faded, and the United States entered what was to be a long duel for power and influence with the Soviet Union. The Cold War had begun.

Within this changed context, Congress extended the authorization for the international educational and cultural programs by passing the Smith-Mundt Act, the United States Information and Cultural Exchange Act of 1948. For the first time when America was not at war, the act pledged the United States government “to conduct international information, education, and cultural exchange activities on a worldwide scale.” Moreover, the object of the program, the law declared, was “to promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries, and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries.”

Behind those words lay deep concern about Soviet foreign policy objectives and America’s security abroad. In addition, there were more specific concerns about anti-American propaganda in the Soviet Union’s various information programs. The legislative mandate that the American exchange programs should seek “to promote a better understanding of the United States” was in fact a mandate for the United States to use some of its cultural diplomacy programs, particularly the information programs, for a hard-hitting propaganda campaign of its own.

---

As part of the Smith-Mundt Act, the State Department's cultural division was reorganized once again. Two separate offices were created. The Office of Educational Exchange was assigned responsibilities for the “international exchange of persons” and the maintenance of overseas libraries and institutes. And an Office of International Information was put in charge of press and publications, broadcasting, and motion pictures. The new administrative setup reflected a view that the educational and cultural exchange programs, which aimed at promoting international understanding from a long-term perspective, should be separate from the “information and media” programs which had more short-term objectives, particularly countering Soviet propaganda.

As the cleavage lines of the Cold War hardened, additional emphasis was placed on explaining America’s viewpoint and objectives to the rest of the world. The United States Information Agency was created in 1953, as an agency that was independent of the State Department. The new agency contained all of the information programs, including the Voice of America that had previously been in the Department of State; but the government’s educational exchange programs remained at the State Department. (Two years later, part of the administration of the exchange programs, their operation overseas, was assigned to USIA.)

At the same time as the overt information programs of the United States government were being strengthened, the Central Intelligence Agency, as part of its covert efforts to fight communism abroad, was supporting a wide variety of intellectual and cultural programs overseas. In an effort to maintain ties between Americans and intellectuals and artists in foreign countries, the agency helped create the Congress for Cultural Freedom, and it secretly provided funding for exhibitions of American art, tours by U.S. performing arts groups, and the publication of a cultural magazine overseas.

Meanwhile, however, under the Eisenhower Administration (1953-1961), a new and fully visible emphasis on educational and cultural exchanges also began to emerge. Under International Cultural Exchange legislation passed in 1954 and 1956, 111 attractions, ranging from Dizzy Gillespie to the New York Philharmonic, were sent to 89 countries in the program’s first four years. In 1954 the Office of Foreign Buildings of the Department of State launched a ten-year $200 million program to build new embassies and consulates on four continents. Using an advisory committee of three leading architects appointed on a rotating basis, the State Department tried with considerable success to ensure that the new embassies abroad would be
distinguished buildings. In addition, an East-West Center was created with government funds at the University of Hawaii, “to promote better relations between the United States and the nations of Asia and the Pacific through cooperative study, training, and research.” And in 1958, the International Cultural Exchange and Trade Fair Participation Act was passed, further strengthening the State Department’s cultural presentations program.

This renewed emphasis on cultural exchanges and cultural diplomacy strongly reflected President Eisenhower’s own vision and values. When he was president of Columbia University, before running for president of the United States in 1952, Eisenhower had actively supported the creation of an American Assembly program of conferences and reports, which tried to bring together experts with differing, and often opposing, viewpoints on major issues of public policy. Eisenhower believed that if men and women of goodwill could be brought together to hammer out a common position on major policy problems, progress could be made on solving those problems. Later, during his years in the White House, President Eisenhower held an equally strong belief that cultural exchanges among people would lead in time to greater understanding and the preservation of world peace.

Meanwhile, foreign policy considerations were playing a major role in building support for a new federal arts policy in the American domestic political arena. In January 1961 President Kennedy was inaugurated, and shortly thereafter the new president appointed Philip H. Coombs, who had been program director for education at the Ford Foundation, to a newly created position of Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs. Coombs was at a planning meeting in the Occidental Restaurant in Washington, D.C., in September 1961, which led to the appointment of August Heckscher as the first Special Consultant to the President on the Arts. And it was Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., as a staff member in the Kennedy White House, who was sending memos to the president arguing that it was important to develop a domestic federal arts program in part in order to change “the world’s impression of the United States as a nation of money-grubbing materialists.” Moreover, four years later in 1965, Richard Goodwin, another White House staff member, was telling President Johnson the same thing, when Johnson’s commitment was essential to holding the House of Representatives in session late on a

---

September night, and passing the bill which created a National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities.

In the 1960’s and 1970’s, there were two more events which helped to shape the direction of the U.S. government’s programs in cultural policy. In 1961 the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act, the Fulbright-Hays Act, was passed. As one State Department official put it, that legislation “restored international educational and exchange programs as a recognized area of our official foreign relations.”

Then, in 1978, during President Jimmy Carter’s Administration, the United States International Communication Agency was created as an independent agency. The reorganization combined the functions of the United States Information Agency (USIA) and the Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. In a letter to Congress, President Carter stressed the new agency’s dual mandate. It was “to tell the world about our society and politics – in particular our commitment to cultural diversity and individual liberty.” But the agency was also “to tell ourselves about the world, so as to enrich our own culture as well as to give us the understanding to deal effectively with problems among nations.” The 1978 reorganization also sought to end the previous separation between management of the exchange programs in Washington by the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and their administration overseas by USIA.

Two years later, Ronald Reagan defeated Jimmy Carter in the 1980 presidential election, and in 1981 President Reagan appointed his close friend, Charles Z. Wick, as the director of the United States International Communication Agency. (Wick got the agency’s name changed back to USIA in 1982.) Holding office from 1981 to 1989, Wick was the longest-serving director in USIA’s history. Moreover, his tenure as the head of the USIA reflected both the hard side and the softer side of cultural diplomacy. Wick shared President Reagan’s view of the Soviet Union as “an evil empire,” and he used the need for countering Soviet propaganda as a rationale for gaining increased funding for his agency. Wick worked to toughen the media and propaganda side of USIA’s programs. In 1981 he also proposed cutting the exchange programs by half, hoping to use the saved funds for new media projects which he wanted to start. In this effort, however, he was stopped. A successful campaign by former Fulbright Scholars and leaders in the American education and art worlds persuaded Congress to maintain the exchange program funding at its existing level. Later, however, with the signing of the new Cultural Exchange
Agreement with the Soviet Union in 1985, and then President Reagan’s firm commitment to the discussions with Premier Gorbachev that led to the mutual arms reduction agreements, Wick’s emphasis at USIA also changed. In the later years of Wick’s tenure, the exchange programs were expanded and flourished.

During the Administration of President George Bush (1989-1993) several momentous developments that changed international relations took place. The Soviet Union disintegrated; countries in Eastern Europe abandoned communism and were freed of Soviet domination; and East and West Germany were reunified. In these altered circumstances, the Bush Administration began to build a new non-Cold War profile for the USIA and other aspects of cultural diplomacy.

Then, in 1991-1992, the U.S. economy weakened and there was a severe recession. The 1992 presidential election campaign debate focused primarily on economic and other domestic issues. Foreign policy issues were probably less salient in 1992 than in any presidential election during the preceding 50 years. Bill Clinton won the election, and during the next eight years of the Clinton Administration (1993-2001), there were several new developments in the realm of cultural diplomacy. Most notably, perhaps, were continued attempts to cut USIA’s budget. In 1999 the functions of the United States Information Agency, with the exception of the International Broadcasting Bureau, were transferred to the Department of State. The International Broadcasting Bureau, which included the Voice of America, became an independent agency, although receiving policy guidance from the Secretary of State. With this new reorganization, as Juliet Antunes Sablosky of Georgetown University has pointed out, “the exchange programs of the U.S. government were going home to the State Department from which they emerged.”^7 To coordinate and oversee the State Department’s varied programs in cultural diplomacy, a new position was created: Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy.

Meanwhile, in the White House, the President and Mrs. Clinton announced the creation of the White House Millennium Council. In the words of Mrs. Clinton, plans were being made to determine “how, as a nation, we could mark this turning of the calendar from 1999 to 2000.” In all, more than 80 official projects of the Millennium Council were undertaken; and a substantial number of those projects were examples of cultural diplomacy. To celebrate creativity and scholarship, nine “Millennium Evenings at the White House” were organized.

---

hosted by President and Mrs. Clinton. These featured presentations and discussions involving some of America’s leading artists, scholars, and scientists, which were broadcast and cybercast live from the East Room of the White House. The international program of the Millennium Council stimulated some 30 projects, many with the Department of State. Some of these projects included tours of U.S. art and artists in the United Kingdom and beyond. And on November 28, 2000, President and Mrs. Clinton hosted and the Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, chaired the first White House Conference on Culture and Diplomacy.

In January 2001, the new Administration of President George W. Bush, like the Clinton Administration, began its first year focused primarily on domestic issues and concerns. Then came September 11, 2001, and the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. These horrifying events, America’s response to this new challenge, and later, the war in Iraq raised a whole set of new issues relating to the U.S. government’s cultural diplomacy, particularly its dealings with the Arab world. It was with these kinds of issues that American policy makers concerned with cultural diplomacy were grappling, in the first half of 2003.

……………………………

From this survey of nearly 70 years of cultural diplomacy efforts by the United States government, a number of deeper patterns and trends appear to emerge.

1. Active involvement in – and funding for – cultural diplomacy programs by the federal government has most often been stimulated by a perceived foreign threat or crisis. The Nazi threat really got the United States started in the business of cultural diplomacy. World War II expanded American involvement still further, and the Cold War with the Soviet Union enlarged many of these activities even more.

2. There may therefore be special challenges in maintaining the government’s interest and funding, to say nothing of the creativity of its cultural diplomacy activities, in times when there seems to be less of a foreign policy threat. In addition, the whole process probably becomes even more complicated when Americans are no longer living in a bipolar world – of the United States versus the Soviet Union. The development of cultural policy initiatives becomes much
more complex when there are many centers of international power and influence, and powerful
new forces of globalism and astonishingly rapid technological change are at work.

3. The new threat to American security posed by international terrorism after September 11,
2001, is bound to have pervasive effects on the nature and direction of American cultural
diplomacy. The long duel with the Soviet Union shaped American policy in this field for more
than 40 years. New concerns with global terrorism are likely to have a lengthy impact as well.
They may be the primary factor shaping the development of American cultural diplomacy
throughout the first part of the 21st century. One of the more pressing current issues will be
building cultural understanding in the Middle East, particularly in post-war Iraq and Afghanistan.

4. In the world of American cultural diplomacy, there has often been a thin line between
making the case for America’s perceived interests, the “propaganda” side of United States
information programs, and the softer side of U.S. cultural diplomacy, the programs that primarily
emphasize the two-way building of cultural understanding, with all that implies. Both aspects of
U.S. cultural diplomacy have been present for nearly 70 years, and at times there has been
considerable friction between proponents of the two types of programs. Nevertheless, both of
these strands of American cultural diplomacy are likely to continue. In addition, the new White
House Office of Global Communications is designed to advise on the strategic directions and
themes that government agencies use to communicate with foreign nations.

5. Another pattern that seems to emerge is that foreign policy making and domestic
policymaking are inextricably intertwined. The creation of the National Endowment for the Arts
and the National Endowment for the Humanities was importantly influenced by foreign policy
considerations. And the failure of the State Department’s “Advancing American Art” exhibition
in 1946 was caused primarily by domestic political considerations. One could think of many
other examples of how political change factors have flowed from the foreign policy arena into
the domestic policy arena, and vice versa.

6. Alexander Pope once wrote, “For forms of government let fools contest/whate’er is best
administer’d is best.” But the fact is that government organizational structures and government
reorganizations of the federal government’s cultural diplomacy activities (and there have been
quite a few such reorganizations) have involved some very real stakes and some very real policy values. They have often been related to the fundamental question of what kind of vision should be emphasized in America’s programs of cultural diplomacy.

7. Programs in cultural diplomacy are often strongest if they have a firm institutional base, grounded in legislation, and when they have strong support at the top of the federal government. The increased support for both cultural exchange and information programs in the later years of the Reagan Administration, aided by Charles Wick’s close friendship with President Reagan, is a case in point. And cultural diplomacy programs also benefited from strong support by President Eisenhower and President Clinton.

8. Cultural diplomacy programs also may benefit if they are fortunate enough to develop a political constituency that cares about those programs. It is often said that the Department of State is weakened in dealings within the federal government because it does not have a political constituency. Yet it is clear that some State Department programs have developed significant constituencies over the years. The rallying of Fulbright Scholar alumni and elements of the U.S. academic and cultural worlds in support of the Fulbright Program in 1981 is a case in point.

9. There have been times when America’s cultural diplomacy programs have suffered budget cuts because of indifference; and, on occasion, they have come under heated attack. Despite these difficulties and setbacks, they have persisted and appear likely to remain a permanent aspect of American foreign policy.

10. Finally, some of the fundamental goals of cultural diplomacy appear to be like the value of the arts. They are not easy to measure. This is particularly true of the softer side of cultural diplomacy, the fostering of mutual and cultural understanding. There will always be debates about how important such programs are in the real world. The case for such programs however, was once made by an American Secretary of State in the following manner. The former president of South Africa, F.W. DeKlerk, who released Nelson Mandela from prison and began his country’s transformation to a multiracial democracy, made a USIA-sponsored visit to
America. DeKlerk later told the U.S. Secretary of State that that visit to America was the defining event that changed his ideas about blacks and whites living together.